We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. In such countries, BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that tend to be linked to vertical investment flows and trade competition, and include low environmental standards or labor rights. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits, basic infrastructure, investment in environmentally friendly technologies or land reform. The combined lock-in and constraining effects of BITs are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we argue that democracies have higher accountability and a lower threat perception for dissent, mitigating the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypotheses.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has emerged as a key economic flow in the global economy. To reduce risk and entice direct capital investment, since the 1960s countries have ratified a large number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Currently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that 178 countries are involved in at least one BIT, with more than 2900 BITs signed among these countries. Some view bilateral investment treaties as a development tool, arguing that BITs channel much needed capital to poor countries (Leo 2010) . Others fear that the favorable treatment given to foreign investors through BITs can worsen the environmental or human rights practices of states (Peterson and Gray 2003) . Indeed, the most methodologically sophisticated recent evidence shows that countries signing more BITs see a greater inflow of foreign direct investment (Buthe and Milner 2009 , Kerner 2009 , Allee and Peinhardt 2011 , Haftel 2010 ). The potential negative externalities of the "broad and asymmetrical" (Simmons 2014, p. 12 ) rights granted to investors have received, however, much less attention. This paper is the first systematic theoretical and empirical investigation into whether BITs influence states' human rights practices.
Bilateral investment treaties include provisions that guarantee investor rights as well as mechanisms that investors can use to legally enforce such provisions (Elkins et al. 2006) . To a great degree, then, developing countries have signed BITs to attract foreign investment and they have done so primarily because of competitive pressures (Elkins et al. 2006) . Recent work shows that host states may have not fully anticipated the constraining effects and costs of such investment treaties (Jandhyala et al. 2011, Poulsen and Aisbett 2013) , and started to overtly push back against the constraining effect of BITs on their domestic policy space (Simmons 2014, Poulsen and Aisbett 2013) . In addition, human rights groups have charged that the hands of capital importing states are tied by investment treaties, generating important grievances and worsening governments' human rights practices. For example, the UKColombia BIT was signed in 2010 but is not yet ratified. Human rights and anti-poverty groups 1 are concerned that this BIT containing an international arbitration clause will expose the Colombian government to costly lawsuits, impact Colombian land reform programs, and threaten the return of 5 million internally displaced people. Similarly, NGOs 2 have reservations about the ongoing negotiations on a US-India BIT, including about how the investor-state dispute mechanism can undermine the domestic policy space and domestic justice system. Yet, to date, there is no consistent evidence that the global investment regime has had such deleterious effects.
Our key contention is that BITs have the potential to negatively influence human rights practices because they lock in legally enforceable conditions attractive to investors, both retrospectively and into the future. The lock-in effect of BITs can force the hand of the government to favor multi-national corporations or foreign investors even at the cost of violating the rights of their own citizenry.
Retrospectively, many developing countries compete for investment and trade on issues ranging from environmental regulations to labor standards and welfare spending and tend to be destinations of vertical investment seeking cost efficiencies. BITs lock in these initial favorable conditions. In addition, BIT provisions constrain future policies, from the provision of welfare benefits, basic infrastructure and investment in environmentally friendly technologies to land reform. Locked-in low standards for environmental protection or labor rights and constrained policies are important sources of popular grievance in host states. The literature on the causes of repression suggests that human rights violations are key responses of states to the manifested or just anticipated protest that can results from these grievances. We will argue however, that states' reaction to such potential dissent and the negative human rights consequences of BITs is moderated by regime type.
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009. We find that countries that ratify a greater number of BITs have worse human rights practices. We also show that the effect of the cumulative number of ratified BITs is conditional on political regime: BITs are more likely to result in human rights violations in non-democracies. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a large number of control variables, coding of BIT specific clauses 3 or focusing only on North-South BITs that likely govern over de facto investment flows, instrumental variable techniques, exclusion of outliers, variations in sample size or alternative measures of human rights practices.
The paper makes several contributions. We are the first to systematically theorize and test the effect of the global investment regime on states' human rights practices. A plausible motivation for joining international treaties, including BITs is frail domestic institutions and low credibility with investors. Yet the evidence in favor of a credible commitment rationale for BITs is weak for variables ranging from political institutions (democracy or political constraints) to economic risks (property rights or law and order) (Appendix Table A1 ). Specifically, no evidence exists that countries with bad human rights records sign or ratify BITs for credibility reasons (Vadlamannati 2009 , Neumayer 2006 ). Our work however shows theoretical reasons and robust empirical evidence for an effect running from BITs to human rights violations. This research thus contributes to recent work investigating the effect of international economic treaties 4 or international organizations 5 on states' human rights practices.
Second, we unpack the specific causal mechanisms through which FDI may affect human rights practices. In our empirical models we allow for a direct effect of FDI inflows which appears to aid human rights practices. This likely occurs via better economic development and growth, as discussed in the literature (Li and Liu 2005 , Alfaro 2003 , Alfaro et al. 2004 . FDI has, however, been linked to human rights through opposing arguments that are unlikely to be captured by the variables used in the literature. Our focus on BITs can capture directly the preferential and favorable treatment 6 that many multinationals enjoy in developing countries and that is locked in by BITs. 3 We code BITs that include a direct arbitration clause to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
4 Hafner-Burton (2005b) , Hafner-Burton (2009), Spilker and Bohmelt (2013) .
5 Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006 ), Keith and Poe (2000) .
6 Simmons (2014 ), Van Harten (2012 .
Finally, recent work argues that states ratify BITs within a bounded rationality framework and do not appreciate the degree to which their hands are tied (Poulsen and Aisbett 2013) . Our evidence raises doubt with regards to these arguments, especially the strong claim of bounded rationality, because it appears that host states that have signed more BITs protect investor rights, even at the cost of violating the rights of their domestic populations.
The paper proceeds as follows: We first discuss the broader evidence on FDI and human rights practices and then elaborate on the legal protection afforded by BITs to investors. We then explain how BITs may affect human rights practices and derive two hypotheses. Data and research design are discussed next, followed by our empirical findings. The final section concludes this paper.
Foreign direct investment and human rights
The economic rationale for the globalization of trade and investment is a more efficient allocation of resources or gains from specialization and economies of scale. Supporters of globalization have also argued that it improves human rights practices, while detractors voiced concerns about human rights degradation. The evidence on the effect of FDI on human rights is mixed, although recent studies support a positive impact. 7 Work that traces itself to dependency theories and "race to the bottom" ideas argues that foreign investors co-opt local elites and extract local resources (Bhattacharya et al. 1997) or, alternatively, use exit threats as leverage for tax breaks, favorable labor policies and wages, and fewer welfare programs (Haggard and Maxfield 1996) . To sustain such investor-friendly policies governments arguably need to control the masses, including through "repression and curtailment or denials of civil and political rights for the populations of developing countries" (Meyer 1996, p.379 ).
On the other hand, FDI is suggested to improve governments' respect for human rights through several mechanisms. A key argument is that market liberalization brought by trade openness or FDI boosts economic development, which promotes better human rights practices (Apodaca 2001) . Although 7 A positive effect of FDI on human rights practices is identified in Richards et al. (2001) , Hafner-Burton (2005a) . Sorens and Ruger (2012) , however, find no effect.
not unequivocally, FDI is associated with better growth outcomes in a wide range of situations 8 and the improvement in human rights may happen because development sustains the middle class, which demands more respect for political and human rights (Richards et al. 2001 , Meyer 1996 . Alternatively, economic development produces political stability by improving living standards, reducing the need to repress on the side of governments (Gelleny and McCoy 1999). 9 FDI is thus linked to human rights in complex ways and through opposing arguments that are unlikely to be captured by the variables used in the literature measuring the stock or flows of FDI. In the context of the link between FDI and human rights, our focus on BITs usefully captures and empirically insulates the aspects of FDI flowing into developing countries pointed out by the "race to the bottom"
literature. As we make the case below, BITs lock-in any favorable initial conditions granted to multinational corporations to attract FDI to host countries. BITs are thus one direct way to capture the effect of such alleged favorable treatment of foreign investors. Empirically, then the measures of FDI included in our empirical models, should capture the residual effect of direct investment through channels like economic development and improved living standards.
Bilateral investments treaties (BITs)
In the absence of multilateral institutions, BITs have been one of the most visible and powerful legal instruments governing the global growth of FDI (Elkins et al. 2006) . These treaties offer strong protection to foreign investors while human rights provisions in BITs are marginal, at best.
8 Li and Liu (2005) find a direct positive effect of FDI on growth and an indirect through human capital. Alfaro (2003) shows a positive effect on growth, coming from FDI in manufacturing and a negative effect from FDI in the primary sector. Alfaro et al. (2004) also finds that FDI is likely to promote growth in countries with well-developed financial markets. Still, other work, finds no direct effect of FDI on economic growth (Carkovic and Levine 2005) . 9 Moreover, FDI may promote better human rights practices because FDI is attracted by countries with already better human rights records (Blanton and Blanton 2007, Barry et al. 2013) .
Direct investment in a foreign country implies important sunk cost and BITs are designed to address investors' concern about the future behavior of host states (Elkins et al. 2006) . In contrast to strong investor protection, very few, if any, BITs mention human rights or associated fields (Jacob 2010 ) and many developing countries would like to see BITs include more obligations for investors (Milner 2014 
BITs and human rights
The last two decades have seen a great deal of informal polemics on whether the global investment regime and, more specifically, BITs harm human rights. Human rights organizations are particularly vocal about the effect of BITs on governments' policy autonomy to create social peace and justice. 16 We are the first ones, however, to engage in systematic theorizing and rigorous empirical testing.
14 "Reaffirming their (treaty parties) commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their obligations under international law, including the principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
(UNCTAD IIA database). 
Developing countries and policies favoring investors
Many developing countries continue to compete in trade or for foreign investment by offering low environmental regulations, taxes, and lax labor standards, and reducing welfare spending. BITs de facto lock-in such favorable treatment granted to investors.
Recent scholarship shows that there are specific issues on which developing countries engage in "races to the bottom" to attract foreign investment. For example, Davies and Vadlamannati (2013) find the late 1990s by the OECD (Peterson 2009 ). NGOs also express concern in individual BITs negotiations, as for example the UK-Colombia BIT or the US-India BIT.
17 Even if investors have extensive legal protection, states still break contracts with multinational enterprises (Blake 2013 , Allee and Peinhardt 2011 , Wellhausen 2015 . 18 Others note the lock-in effect of BITs (e.g., Milner 2014). We discuss why the conditions preserved in developing countries by BITs tend to be favorable to investors.
that developing countries compete for FDI by relaxing de facto labor practices. Similarly, Klemm and Parys (2012) show that developing countries compete for capital with other countries in the same region with regards to the corporate income tax rate, as well as by offering corporate income tax holidays.
The existence of races to the bottom may further depend on the way in which countries are integrated in the global economy (Mosley 2007) . Our theory thus fits best flows of vertical FDI 19 , as this type of investment is particularly interested in conditions that cut production costs and recent research shows conclusive evidence that much of the investment in developing countries is indeed vertical.
Supporting our contention, recent work examining country characteristics (market size, quality and quantity of labor, location, tax rates) to infer the nature of FDI (Blonigen and Wang 2005, Hanson et al. 2003) . A similar conclusion is reached by UNCTAD (2004) which shows that for both manufactured goods, but also services, FDI in developing countries is increasingly vertical. In addition, Buthe and
Milner (2008) They also find that, while for water pollution regulation both a race to the bottom and a race to the top can be observed, air pollution regulation only responds to downward policy changes in trade competitors. Rudra (2011) finds that especially the size of exports has a negative effect on access to potable water, an effect that is mediated by income inequality and Mosley and Uno (2007) show that trade openness worsens collective labor rights.
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In addition to locking in past investor friendly policies, BITs constrain future government choices for sustainable development and welfare improvement. Rudra (2002) 
BITs clauses lock-in favorable policies
Several specific BIT provisions act to both lock-in initial conditions and constrain the future choices of governments. We point to three of the most prominent ones: national treatment, stabilization clauses under the umbrella clause and indirect expropriation.
One of the most important standards of investor treatment included in BITs is the national treatment clause, which prohibits host government from making negative differentiations between national and foreign investors (Blake 2013) . Such prohibitions can constrain development strategies significantly.
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For instance, host governments are restricted in asking foreign multi-national corporations to locate investment in underdeveloped regions or employ domestic inputs in their production. In addition, BITs restrict host governments from favoring domestic firms that match the government's environmental or social policy goals.
Domestic policy autonomy is also restricted by the inclusion of stabilization clauses in investment contracts 27 that prevent host states from changing domestic law as it stands at the time of investment.
Such clauses aim to reassure foreign investors in projects that demand a large amount of investment, especially in infrastructure or natural resource exploration that domestic law will not change to the detriment of the investor. Investors can invoke the stabilization clause from contracts with the host states 25 The tribunal decisions in BIT arbitrations are final and binding, with no ground for appeal. Annulment is the only option (other than noncompliance) available to a party if it disagrees with the arbitration decision (Simmons 2014) . 26 While the majority of countries do not carve-out exceptions to the national treatment clause, some investment treaties do include instances when the host countries can deviate from national treatment. 27 It is difficult to estimate the number of international contracts containing stabilization clauses.
Amnesty International (2006) estimates that stabilization clauses are more prevalent in the contracts of poorer countries facing groups of large multi-national corporations.
https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/hrtradeinvestmentmatters.pdf under the "umbrella clause" of BITs and directly go to international arbitration. About 40% BITs include such umbrella clauses (Gill et al. 2004) . 
BITs, grievance and human rights violations
The lock-in effect of BITs can force the hand of the government to favor multi-national corporations or foreign investors even at the cost of having to violate the rights of their own citizenry. First BIT provisions can simply ask the government to directly intervene and physically protect multi-national companies' investment. Second, the same conditions that were designed to be favorable to investors and attract multi-national corporations have the potential to create popular dissent or the expectation of dissent, followed by repressive counters on the side of the government.
Very directly, a common BIT provision includes an obligation to provide foreign investors with "full protection and security". This clause commits host states to exercise "due diligence" in protecting foreign assets and can be invoked by foreign investors when they encounter protests against their operations and practices in host countries. In a recent arbitration case 29 , for example, a Spanish multinational enterprise sued Mexico for failing to uphold the full protection and security clause by claiming that the authorities did not act as quickly and thoroughly as possible to "prevent or put an end 28 The Italian model BIT includes directly stabilization clauses as an international treaty obligation. The use of state repression in response to manifested or anticipated dissent is the result of authorities' assessment of the costs and benefits of rights violations versus other tools at their disposal (Davenport 1995, Nordas and Davenport 2013) . Repression is thus not an automatic response. We explore the variation in the costs of repression in the next subsection. Here we argue that, ceteris paribus, when the government's hands are tied by BITs, it becomes relatively expensive to address the root causes of popular grievance by taking measures against the legally protected investors. In addition, not only are investors' rights legally protected, but these rights limit severely some of the non-repressive options that governments normally use to buy off the potential opposition, including increasing social benefits, cheap access to infrastructure services like water or electricity or providing side payments though domestic companies.
Our first hypothesis follows this discussion: BITs are associated with a worsening of human rights practices (Hypothesis H1).
The mitigating effect of political regime
Several conditions can mitigate the incentives of host states to use repression. We focus on democratic institutions, which, in the repression literature, are a key consistent variable that is shown to increase the cost of rights violations (Davenport and Armstrong 2004) .
Importantly, democracies may, to begin with, be less likely to offer initial conditions that are favorable to foreign investors. Thus, Li (2006) finds that countries with better rule of law, which tend to be democracies, offer lower levels of tax incentives. 33 Also, we argued earlier that favorable trade policies are valued by foreign investors who use developing countries as export platforms. In this context, Cao and Prakash (2012) find that in countries with low political constraints, which tend to be non-democracies, the response to trade pressures is lower de facto standards for air pollution.
Moreover, while BITs tie the hands of all governments in a similar fashion, we argue that democracies and dictatorships vary in two key dimensions that affect states' calculus of the costs and benefits of repression. First, democratic leaders and dictators are likely to have different assessments of the level of threat to their rule posed by popular grievance and dissent. All else equal, the greater the perceived threat to their rule, the more likely that governments will make use of repression (Davenport 1995, Nordas and Davenport 2013) . It is likely, however, that the level of perceived threat emerging from conflict between the interests of multi-national corporations and domestic groups is higher in dictatorships. Protest or mass demonstrations, either manifested or just expected, are more likely to be seen challenges to regimes that severely limit citizens' freedom of speech and association, or voting for the political competition as outlets to express grievance.
Second, at a very fundamental level, democracies and dictatorships face different levels of accountability. In their review of the literature, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) note that "in democracies political leaders who use repression against their citizens can be removed from office through the popular vote and, at the same time, these governments contain numerous institutional checks and balances on government activity" (p. 538). Thus, in political regimes that face real political opposition and a free media, episodes of human rights abuses can be expected to be quickly and widely acknowledged, raising the political and electoral costs of repression. In democracies both mechanisms -33 Li and Resnick (2003) also argue that democratic accountability reduces the ability of governments to offer 'sweet bargains' to foreign investors, which, in turn, reduces the incentives for multinationals to pick democracies as investment locations.
a low threat perception and high accountability -are likely to balance the favorable treatment afforded to investors by BITs with a high cost of repression.
We propose therefore a second hypothesis: The negative impact of BITs on governments' respect for human rights is mitigated in democracies (Hypothesis H2).
Data, measurement and research design
We test the hypotheses using data for 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009. 34 The start year is dictated by the availability of the key dependent variable. The sample includes only developing countries because rich countries have a different position in the global economy and are both sources of FDI and FDI recipients. Human rights practices also tend to be better in rich countries, making it likely that the causal process and government's trade-offs are different in the developing world.
Dependent variable
We use as dependent variable the Cingranelli and Richards (1999) measure of governments' respect for physical integrity rights (CIRI data, updated to 2012). We choose the CIRI data because it explicitly captures governments' human rights practices while other data only captures overall human rights conditions (Cingranelli and Richards 2010 , Cingranelli and Filippov 2010 , Richards et al. 2001 . CIRI codes the occurrence of excessive use of force and, in particular, the use of torture, disappearance, extrajudicial killing, and political imprisonment. The variable we use is an index ranging from 0 (no respect for any of the four physical integrity rights) to 8 (full respect for all four physical integrity rights). The data is coded based on both Amnesty International's Annual Report and the U.S. State
Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. When there is a conflict between these two sources, Amnesty International assessment is treated as authoritative in order to remove a potential bias in favor of US allies (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) .
Independent variables
34 Similar to Poulsen and Aisbett (2013) , these are countries that the World Bank does not classify as high-income for the majority of our sample period.
We use three key independent variables. To test hypothesis one we use the cumulative number of BITs ratified by a country in a given year. The total or cumulative number of BITs that a country is subject to in a given year makes sense because our focus is on the total leverage that foreign investor interests have on the host states via the conclusion of BITs. The logic is that the greater the number of BITs a host state ratifies, the greater the potential for popular grievance and repressive tactics on the side of the government. We also use ratified BITs rather than signed BITs because only ratified BITs are legally binding (Haftel 2010 ). This variable is constructed using the International Investment Agreements (IIA) database on the UNCTAD website. The variable ranges from 0 to 104 and, over the period considered here, developing countries were on average subject to about 11 BITs.
We further explore the heterogeneity of BITs to get at the causal mechanism in our theoretical explanation. First, we emphasize the strength of investors' legal protection. To test our second hypothesis, we use the polity2 score from Polity IV dataset. The variable ranges from -10 to 10, with larger values indicating higher levels of democracy. We include an interaction term between the polity2 score and the cumulative ratified BITs to test the conditional effect of investment treaties.
Control variables
We use as a baseline empirical specification the variables in Hafner-Burton ( 36 Using log (FDI in millions) our results are robust in all model specification. However, the FDI variable is only statistically significant and positive in the instrumental variable models.
and Davenport (2013) we include political dissent coded as the sum of antigovernment protest, riots, and general strike (Banks CNTS). Additional relevant variables are discussed in the robustness checks.
Model specification
We use an OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) and adjust for first-order auto-correlation by specifying an AR(1) process 37 . All models include country dummies to capture country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. We also include half-decade period dummy variables to account for time-specific shocks or time trends that may influence both human rights violations and BIT ratification. All independent variables are lagged one year. The empirical model takes the following form:
We expect that 2  is negative indicating that BITs work to worsen countries' human rights practices. Table 1 The empirical estimations support our two hypotheses. Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 include the un-interacted cumulative number of BITs and the polity2 score. Across all the models, as expected, the coefficient on the cumulative number of investment treaties is negative and statistically significant. A greater number 37 The results are broadly similar when autocorrelation is corrected by (i) using a panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure; (ii) adding a lagged dependent variable to our estimations. Table A1 ), we show instrumental variable estimations to address the potential endogeneity problem. We use two instruments for our key independent variable -the cumulative number of ratified BITs. The first instrument measures the average of the total ratified BITs in neighboring states in a given year. Following Kerner (2009) we define neighboring countries using the Correlates of War coding for type 1 or type 2 contiguity, which includes countries that share a land border or are separated by 12 miles of water or less. This instrument aims to capture the competitive nature of BITs signing (Elkins et al. 2006 ) and the correlation of the instrument with our independent variable is 0.69. The second instrument uses the three year lagged (year t-2, t-1 and t) total of new BITs ratified in other countries in the world. This instrument intends to capture the trend of BITs ratification and the opportunities of concluding BITs. The correlation of this instrument with the key independent variable is 0.29 in the sample used in our model. We use Stata command xtivreg2 and the results shown in Table 1 (Models 3 and 4) continue to support our hypotheses. The chosen instruments perform well: The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions tests the overall validity of the instruments (including the choice of exogenous variables) and failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support for the model. For Model 3 and 4, the Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(2) pvalue is 0.38 and, respectively, 0.54 , so we can not reject the null hypothesis. In instrumental variable models, while chosen instruments may be exogenous they may be weak, biasing the estimated coefficients. For both Models 3 and 4, the weak identification Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 42. This value easily passes the "rule of thumb" (Staiger and Stock 1997 ) that the F statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be considered a problem. 38 In addition to models 3 and 4, we use similar instrumental variables for our modified independent variables (BITs with ICSID and Adjusted North-South BITs) and the results shown in Table 1 are largely robust.
Results and discussion
More than just examining multiplicative interaction terms for direction and statistical significance, (2011)'s dyadic dataset of BIT signing, we first calculate for each dyad-year the probability that the two countries in the dyad will become members of a BIT in that year.
We then add up the predicted probabilities for each country and year and divide that (monadic) sum by the number of possible BIT partners the country could have had for the given year. This calculation is our third instrument, as it yields a measure of the average probability that a country signs a BIT with all other countries in the world in the given year.
large. 39 This is consistent with our theoretical story that governments react to the legal protection of investors in international tribunals and that the effect of BITs should be larger as these treaties actually regulate de facto inflows of capital to developing countries.
To further assess the substantive effect of our key independent variable, we use Models 2, 6 and 8
to predict human rights conditions as we vary the cumulative number of BITs and the level of the Polity democracy score (Table 2) Finally, regarding our control variables, we find that soft PTAs may increase repression levels. On the other hand, we find no impact for hard PTAs. In addition, ratification of human right treaties is associated with worse practices across our models. Also, we find that the level of democracy, trade openness, GDP per capita, population density, civil war, and political dissent are all significant predictors of human rights practices and take on expected signs. Importantly, we find that net FDI inflows are associated with better human rights. This effect, and the results supporting our hypotheses, maintain when we use the ten-year lagged moving average of FDI inflows to mitigate the potential endogeneity between FDI and human rights practices.
Robustness
We verify the robustness of the empirical results against additional threats to inference. These include the timing of when BITs started to give investors access to international arbitration without the requirement to exhaust local remedies; the operationalization of the dependent variable; and, finally, the presence of outliers and the effect of additional variables.
First, we restrict our sample to begin from 1990 onward because it was not until the late 1980s that BITs began to give investors access to investor-state arbitration without first having to exhaust local remedies. This strategy is similar to Poulsen and Aisbett (2013) , who note that, after 1990, the vast majority of BITs include a binding consent to investor-state arbitration. Our theory centers on the leverage of multinational corporations have on host states and therefore the magnitude of lock-in effect of initial policies. It may be argued therefore that focusing on BITs with access to investor-state arbitration is a more appropriate way to capture the foreign investors leverage through BITs. Model 9 and 10 in the Online Appendix Table A2 restrict our sample to BITs ratified after 1990 and show that our results are robust.
Second, we use an alternative measure of human rights violations -the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2012 ). The PTS database has two separate indexes: one based on US State Department Country Reports and another based on Amnesty International's Annual Report. An ordinal five category variable that captures personal integrity rights is constructed for each PTS index, with a larger value indicating a higher level of repression. To be consistent with the interpretation of CIRI data used in the main analysis, we invert both PTS indexes so that a larger value reflects a higher respect of human rights. PTS' two sources have slightly diverging coverage, and both have been criticized for possible biases: State Department Reports protect the US and its allies (Poe et al. 2001) . Amnesty International
Reports have often not rated countries with few human rights violation in the 1970s and 1980s (Wood 2008) . Scholars thus differ in how they use the two PTS indexes. Some use them separately -either the US State Department Country Reports (Nordas and Davenport 2013, Conrad and DeMeritt 2013) or Amnesty International's Annual Report (Nordas and Davenport 2013, Wright 2014) . Others use the average of these two indexes to counterbalance biases (Blanton 2005 , Apodaca 2001 ). We employ all three ways of dealing with the PTS data. Table A5 in the Online Appendix shows our estimates. The coefficient for cumulative BITs remains negative, but loses statistical significance in the non-interaction model. However, the interacted models remain very similar to our findings in Table 1, supporting Hypothesis 2. We maintain, however, that the CIRI data is more appropriate for testing our hypotheses because the PTS indexes cannot differentiate the human rights practices of governments from broader human right conditions (Richards 2001, Cingranelli and Richards 1999) .
Finally, we exclude outlier countries and include additional control variables. Our results are substantively similar if we exclude the countries that are above the 99 th percentile in terms of cumulative BITs ratified (China, Romania, the Czech Republic) or above the 95 th percentile (China, Romania, the Czech Republic, Turkey, India, Egypt). We also test the robustness of our hypotheses by including additional control variables: (i) Simmons (2014) finds that states are more likely to sign restrictive BITs during economic downturns. Economic crisis may also induce governments to repress social unrest. We control for the 3 year lagged average economic growth (WDI).
(ii) Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006 find that IMF or World Bank adjustment programs tend to worsen human rights in loan receiving countries. We control for the number of years that countries are under either IMF or WB programs. Following Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006 we also control for British or French colonial legacy. (iii) The "shaming" activities of human rights international NGOs may also improve states' human rights practices. We control for this by using a new dataset of shaming events of more than 400 human right NGOs towards governments (Murdie and Davis 2012) . Table A2 shows that our results are largely robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.
Conclusion
This paper is a first theoretical and empirical investigation into how and whether the global investment regime, and, in particular the ratification of BITs, affects human rights in developing countries. In these countries, we argue that BITs have the potential to worsen human rights practices because they lock in initial conditions attractive to investors, both retrospectively and into the future. Retrospectively, many developing countries still compete for investment and trade on issues ranging from environmental regulations, taxes, labor standards, and welfare spending and BITs lock in these initial favorable conditions. In addition, BITs provisions can constrain the future policy choices of states for sustainable development, from the provision of basic infrastructure and investment in environmentally friendly technologies to land reform. Low standards for environmental protection or labor rights and constraints on development and social policies can be important sources of popular grievance. Moreover, repression and human rights violations are key responses of states to the manifested or just anticipated protest and dissent that can result from such grievances. We argue however, that states' reaction to threats and the negative human rights consequences of BITs will be moderated by regime type. Democracies are less likely to offer investors more initially favorable conditions, as seen in tax incentive policies or de facto environmental standards. Also, relatively low perceived threat of protest or dissent to the regime stability and a high level of political accountability in democracies increase the cost of state repression and are more likely to balance the favorable treatment afforded to investors by BITs.
Using a sample of 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009, we find support for our theoretical arguments. Countries that have ratified a higher number of BITs have worse human rights practices.
This effect holds and is larger when we restrict our BITs count to only those treaties that have stringent arbitration clauses (ICSID arbitration) or are likely to govern over de facto investment flows (NorthSouth BITs). In addition, we find that the effect of the cumulative number of ratified BITs is conditional on political regime: BITs are more likely to result in human rights violations in non-democracies. The results are robust to alternative modeling techniques, inclusion of controls and variations in the sample.
Our research draws attention to the unintended externalities of concluding BITs. Investment treaties were drafted to facilitate cross-border capital flows and promote development through foreign
investment. Yet we bring robust evidence that ratifying BITs tends to worsen the human rights practices of developing countries, very likely because they tie the hands of governments, supporting thus the concerns of human rights NGOs. Our findings also back the recent move to incorporate human rights standards in the content of BITs, either by explicitly referencing human rights 40 or by including related provisions with regards to labor standards or environmental protection 41 . 
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